Assaying the effect of levodopa on the evaluation of risk in healthy humans. by Symmonds, M et al.
Assaying the Effect of Levodopa on the Evaluation of
Risk in Healthy Humans
Mkael Symmonds1,2*, Nicholas D. Wright1, Elizabeth Fagan1, Raymond J. Dolan1
1Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, United Kingdom, 2Nuffield Department of Clinical Neurosciences,
University of Oxford, John Radcliffe Hospital, Oxford, United Kingdom
Abstract
In humans, dopamine is implicated in reward and risk-based decision-making. However, the specific effects of dopamine
augmentation on risk evaluation are unclear. Here we sought to measure the effect of 100 mg oral levodopa, which
enhances synaptic release of dopamine, on choice behaviour in healthy humans. We use a paradigm without feedback or
learning, which solely isolates effects on risk evaluation. We present two studies (n = 20; n = 20) employing a randomised,
placebo-controlled, within-subjects design. We manipulated different dimensions of risk in a controlled economic paradigm.
We test effects on risk-reward tradeoffs, assaying both aversion to variance (the spread of possible outcomes) and
preference for relative losses and gains (asymmetry of outcomes - skewness), dissociating this from potential non-specific
effects on choice randomness using behavioural modelling. There were no systematic effects of levodopa on risk attitudes,
either for variance or skewness. However, there was a drift towards more risk-averse behaviour over time, indicating that
this paradigm was sensitive to detect changes in risk-preferences. These findings suggest that levodopa administration does
not change the evaluation of risk. One possible reason is that dopaminergic influences on decision making may be due to
changing the response to reward feedback.
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Introduction
Risk is a key concept in decision theory, describing situations of
uncertainty where actions lead to a range of possible outcomes [1].
Risk is ubiquitous both in the natural world and in complex
human economies, and many decisions can be conceptualised as a
trade-off between risk and potential reward. Risk perception is
driven by multiple features of a decision, such as the spread
(measured as variance) of possible outcomes [2,3,4], as well as
asymmetry between better or worse than average outcomes
(measured as skewness) [5,6,7]. While some individuals prefer to
take a risk in exchange for higher possible reward, ‘risk-averse’
individuals require a greater financial incentive to make a risky
choice (i.e. have a greater ‘risk-premium’). Dopamine plays a
central role in reward and risk-based decision-making, but its
specific contribution to risk evaluation in healthy humans is
unclear.
Clinically, Parkinson’s disease (PD), where nigro-striatal dopa-
mine pathways are impoverished, is associated with disrupted
decision-making [8,9]. Dopamine agonists, used to treat PD, can
cause pathological gambling behavior [10,11], a side-effect
exacerbated in dual therapy with both dopamine agonists and
levodopa [12], although some studies report no effect of dopamine
augmentation therapy on decision making in PD patients [13].
Manipulation of dopamine levels in rats disrupts decision-making
under uncertainty in foraging tasks. Amphetamine (which
augments dopamine release), D1-, or D2-receptor agonists can
increase preference for a risky choice, and the effects of
amphetamine can be abolished by dopamine receptor blockade
[14]. Neuroimaging studies have identified subcortical and cortical
dopaminoceptive regions linked to risk and choice [15,16,17,18].
Single-unit recording studies show that tonic firing of dopaminer-
gic midbrain neurons scales with risk [19], although there is debate
about whether this signal represents prediction errors during
learning [20,21], encoded initially at the time of reward feedback
and following learning at the time of reward-predictive signals
[22].
Previous studies have not addressed which specific aspect of risk
dopaminergic modulation might influence. For example, dopa-
mine has been proposed to act as a generic neuromodulatory
signal encoding the uncertainty of predictions [23], hence might
be expected to have a specific impact on evaluation of variance.
Dopamine agonists have also shown to systematically alter choices
and neural activity following better than average (i.e. unexpectedly
good) rewards, hence dopamine might alternatively impact upon
the evaluation of relative gains versus losses in a choice (skewness).
Moreover, previous tasks have tended to employ continual reward
feedback, either in the context of learning or for gambling tasks
where risk is explicit. Dopamine release is strongly associated with
reward feedback and reward anticipation [24], therefore it is
possible that dopamine alters the response to feedback as well as
affecting the statistical evaluation of risk per se. Performance
impairments following dopaminergic depletion in tasks involving
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risk assessment, such as the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) [25], could
be explained in terms of any of these effects.
Here we assessed the effect of dopamine administration on the
statistical evaluation of risk, measuring decision-making in healthy
subjects performing two different economic gambling experiments.
In the first experiment, we tested whether dopamine influences the
trade-off between (expected) reward and variance. In the second
experiment, we tested if dopamine influences the evaluation of
variance, or of relative gains and losses (skewness). Crucially, we
employed a task where we could independently manipulate both
expected value-variance and variance-skewness. Critically, all
choices are based on explicit presentations of risky gambles and
no feedback is given during the task, which controls for effects on
reward feedback or learning such that we can measure solely
effects upon the evaluation of risk. Additionally, using behavioural
modeling we were able to determine whether dopamine simply
makes choices more random (which can often appear as a
tendency towards risk-neutrality). Using a randomised, double
blinded, placebo controlled administration of L-dopa (which
increases vesicular dopamine release in the central nervous system)
[26], we aimed to detect any systematic effects of dopamine
augmentation upon individuals’ risk-reward trade-offs.
Materials and Methods
1. Ethics Statement
Experiments were approved by the Institute of Neurology
(University College London) Ethics Committee. All subjects gave
fully informed written consent for participation.
2. Setup
In total forty healthy participants were recruited, (Experiment
1:7 male/13 female, mean age 23.1, SD=3.44, range 19–32;
Experiment 2:7 male/13 female, mean age 22.4, SD=4.27, range
18–33) and attended on two separate occasions one week apart.
On each week, subjects received either a 100 mg dose of L-dopa
(Madopar - levodopa/benserazide, 100/25 mg, Roche) dissolved
in fruit squash or an indistinguishable fruit squash placebo,
administered 50 minutes before behavioral testing to allow
dopamine to reach peak plasma and neural concentration [27].
Stimuli were presented and responses recorded using Cogent
presentation software (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging,
London) written in MATLAB (version 6.5, MathWork, Natick,
MA). The task was performed on a standard PC, and choices were
indicated using a keyboard. We provided a 5-minute practice
tutorial to demonstrate the paradigm. Data were analysed using
MATLAB and SPSS (SPSS for Windows, Rel. 12.0.1. 2003.
Chicago: SPSS Inc.).
3. Paradigms
To dissociate preferences for different components of risk, in
terms of dispersion (variance) and asymmetry of outcomes
(skewness), we implemented a previously-used decision-making
task design [28] that controls the distribution of outcomes to
ensure that expected value, variance and skewness of a set of
lotteries could be manipulated independently by design. We tested
whether dopamine administration influenced the impact of either
average return, the spread of outcomes (measured as variance) or
relative loss and gain (asymmetry of outcomes, measured as
skewness). On each trial, participants were required to choose (5s
decision time) between taking a ‘sure’ (fixed) amount of money or
electing to ‘gamble’ (choosing to play a lottery with a number of
potential outcomes). Gambles were represented as 4-segment pie-
charts (Figure 1). We conducted two separate experiments, each
with 20 subjects and an identical structure, apart from the specific
stimulus sets employed.
3.1 Experiment 1: Independent manipulation of expected
value and variance. We constructed a stimulus set of 252
lotteries where expected value and variance were independent and
varied over a range (see File S1). Expected value of the lotteries
ranged from £3.25 to £8.00, while variance ranged from 0.47 to
24.05£2. All stimuli were symmetric (i.e. had zero skewness).
Stimuli were constrained to have 4 outcomes (segments of the pie
chart), with outcome probabilities varying in minimum 0.1
increments between 0 and 1. These restrictions allow the
generation of a space of possible lotteries varying in expected
value and variance. EV and variance were orthogonal by design
(correlation coefficient: r=0.07).
3.2 Experiment 2: Independent manipulation of variance
and skewness. Here, we constructed a stimulus set of 252
lotteries where variance and skewness were independent and
varied over a range (see File S2). Expected value of the lotteries
was constant (£5.95–£6.05). Variance ranged from 1.7 to 30.9£2.
Skewness ranged from 238.6 to 38.6£3. Variance and skewness
were orthogonal (correlation coefficient: r ,0.01). As in experi-
ment 1, stimuli were constrained to have 4 outcomes (segments of
the pie chart), with outcome probabilities varying in minimum 0.1
increments between 0 and 1.
This setup allows us to test whether dopamine has a systematic
influence on the trade-off between risk and reward in the absence
of decision feedback or not. We anticipated that we might detect
non-specific effects, such as a shift in risk preference from week 1
to week 2 or an effect of drug on choice randomness, hence our
paradigm and analysis enables us to distinguish and quantify these
effects separately from effects on risk dimensions. If dopamine
purely affects the evaluation of anticipated (mean) reward, we
would expect to observe a shift in risk-reward tradeoff in
experiment 1 but not in experiment 2 where expected value is
constant. If dopamine alternatively affects just the evaluation of
relative losses and gains in a gamble (which we operationalise here
as skewness), then we would expect to observe solely an effect in
experiment 2. If dopamine affects the encoding of variance, we
would expect effects in both experiment 1 and in experiment 2.
On each occasion, the participant made decisions about the
same set of 252 choices. Using a diverse spread of lotteries enables
us to map out responses (choices) to stimuli representing an entire
array of risk and value combinations. Consistent tradeoffs between
different dimensions of value, variance, and skewness can then be
explored and tested by comparing the performance of different
decision-making models where subjects express preferences for
each of these components. In addition, utilising a large range of
possible gambles is akin to psychophysical methods [29], and
means that any specific biases engendered by the configuration of
a particular gamble will have a minor influence on an overall
decision making metric. On each occasion, choices were presented
in a randomised order, and the orientation and ordering of pie
chart segments was also randomised on each trial. Stimulus sets
were constructed and the sure amount alternative was fixed at
£4.50, such that participants would choose to gamble approxi-
mately 50% of the time on average (based on pilot studies). This
meant that the stimulus sets had the greatest power to distinguish
subtle effects on changes in EV-variance and variance-skewness
tradeoffs.
4. Payment
To ensure that subjects chose in accordance with their genuine
preferences, payment was incentive compatible. Four trials were
selected randomly (two from participants’ first session and two
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from their second session) and played out for real at the end of the
second visit. For each selected trial, if subjects chose the sure
amount, they won £4.50, whereas if they elected to gamble, the
lottery was resolved with an animated ‘roulette wheel’ graphic of a
red ball spinning around the pie chart, before coming to rest at a
randomly selected position which determined their winnings from
that trial. Winnings ranged from £20.00 to £42.50 (mean
£32.23), including a baseline participation fee of £12.
5. Behavioural Modelling
For a given lottery with 4 potential outcomes (m1, m2,… mN),
with probabilities p = p1, p2, …pn, we define the statistical moments
(expected value (EV), variance (Var), skewness (Skw)) of the
outcome distribution as follows:
Figure 1. Experimental Paradigm. A. We represented gambles on-screen as pie-charts. The pie chart was divided into different segments
showing possible outcomes from the lottery. The numbers written in each segment showed the monetary value of each outcome (in pounds sterling)
and the angle subtended by each segment indicated the probability of each outcome occurring. A negatively skewed gamble (left) has a small
chance of a worse than average outcome (the tail of the distribution is to the left). Conversely, a positively skewed gamble (right) has a small chance
of a better than average outcome (the tail is to the right). Both example gambles have identical expected value (£6) variance (5£2), but opposite
skewness (+/27.2£3). B. Each task consisted of 252 trials. For each trial, a pie chart was shown, and after 5 seconds, a cue to respond appeared on
screen (for 1 second). Subjects indicated by a button press while the cue was on-screen if they wanted to gamble on the lottery, or alternatively select
a fixed, sure amount of money (of £4.50 throughout). At the end of the experiment on their second visit, four trials were randomly selected and
played out for real. If subjects had elected to gamble, we resolved the lottery by an on-screen graphic of a red ball spinning around the outside of the
pie which stopped at a randomly selected position.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0068177.g001
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EV~
X4
n~1
mnpn ð1Þ
Var~
X4
n~1
mn{EVð Þ2pn ð2Þ
Skw~
X4
n~1
mn{EVð Þ3pn ð3Þ
We analysed choice data by fitting a linear mean-variance-
skewness model (MVS) where individuals are allowed to express
different preferences for variance and skewness. To establish
whether individuals are indeed responding to risk, we test this
MVS model against a series of reduced models, where decisions
are based on mean difference (M) alone (where subjects only take
account of the difference between the sure amount and the
expected value of the gamble in selecting actions), or a mean-
variance model (MV).
We then define the subjective value, or utility (U) of each lottery
for our models:
Mean model (M)
U~EV ð4Þ
Mean-variance model (MV)
U~EVzrVar ð5Þ
Mean-variance-skewness model (MVS)
U~EVzrVarzlSkw ð6Þ
r and l are free parameters, r reflecting preference for
variance, and l reflecting preference for positive versus negative
skewness respectively.
We test a further model able to account for different preferences
for positive and negative skewness (MVS2).
U~EVzrVarzlzSkwzzl{Skw{ ð7Þ
Where Skw+ indictates Skw$0 and Skw2 indicates Skw,0, and
l+ and l2 reflect preferences for positive and negative skewness
respectively.
Our models compare the utility of the lottery with the value of
the sure amount (S) to generate a trial-by-trial probability of
choosing the lottery over the sure amount, using a logistic/softmax
function which allows for noise in action selection (by free
parameter b).
Pchoose gamble~
1
1ze
1
b
U{Sð Þ
ð8Þ
We estimated best-fitting model parameters using maximum
likelihood analysis, with unconstrained optimisation implemented
with a non-linear Nelder-Mead simplex search algorithm in
Matlab (Matlab, Natwick, USA) and compared models using the
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) [30] as an approximations
to the model evidence and penalising model complexity [31].
Results
1. Behaviour
1.1 Experiment 1: Expected value versus variance trade-
off. Subjects distributed their choices between gamble and sure
options throughout the course of the experiment (as intended by
experimental design), choosing to gamble on average 43.1% (SD
617.23%) of trials on placebo, and 40.6% (SD 617.15%) on L-
dopa (compared to a risk-neutral decision maker who would have
gambled on 79% of trials with this stimulus set). There was no
significant difference between these proportions (paired t-test,
t19 = 1.20, p = 0.24) (Figure 2A). Even accounting for the effect of
order in a 262 repeated measures ANOVA (drug/placebo6drug
week 1/drug week 2), there was no overall effect of drug
administration (F1,9 = 0.05, p = 0.95), although the order effect
reached trend significance (F1,9 = 4.38, p = 0.06), with an average
25.7+/28.0% change in percentage gambling from week 1 to
week 2.
1.2 Experiment 2: Variance versus skewness trade-
off. Here, subjects also distributed their choices between gamble
and sure options throughout the course of this experiment,
choosing to gamble in on average 47.8% (SD 619.5%) of trials on
placebo, and 48.4% (SD 619.3%) on L-dopa (compared to a risk-
neutral decision maker who would have always gambled with this
stimulus set). There was no significant difference between these
proportions (paired t-test, t19 = 0.15, p = 0.88) (Figure 2B). As
above, we also entered data into a 262 repeated measures
ANOVA, which confirmed no overall effect of drug administration
(F1,9 = 0.03, p= 0.87), although the order effect again approached
significance (F1,9 = 3.83, p = 0.07), with an average 28.1+/
217.9% change in percentage gambling from week 1 to week 2.
We further examined for any effects on risk in specific
subdomains (e.g. only for positively skewed gambles with a small
chance of high rewards). Choice data were partitioned into 4
domains - high/low variance and positive/negative skewness
decisions - and entered into repeated measures ANOVA. This
revealed no significant effect of drug (F1,9 = 0.01, p= 0.91), with no
significant interaction between drug and domain (F3,9 = 0.11,
p = 0.96).
2. Behavioural Modelling
We next performed a model-based analysis of participants’
choices, where we estimated parameters for variance- and
skewness-aversion from an economic decision model. This model
based analysis was designed firstly to test whether subjects’ made
consistent choices, trading risk and reward in a coherent manner
(as opposed to being insensitive to risk). A lack of drug effect could
be purely due to a baseline indifference to risk in our subjects.
Secondly, parameters estimated from a behavioural model have
greater sensitivity to detect small systematic changes in risk-
preferences than a simple summary analysis of percentage
gambling. Thirdly, we can test specific behavioural hypotheses
by comparing the performance of different models in explaining
the data. Dopamine may induce a change in risk-preference (i.e.
the trade-off between risk and potential reward) or may simply
induce a general bias in choice that leads to an increased
predilection for gambling, without altering risk-sensitivity. Finally,
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we can also test whether dopamine significantly changed choice
randomness or noise as we explicitly model this as a free parameter
that determines the slope of the logistic (softmax) function.
2.1 Sensitivity to risk. We independently manipulated
variance and skewness, and predicted that individuals’ preferences
would be sensitive to both aspects of risk. To test this, we
compared a set of models which predict choice on the basis of
either the mean value of sure vs lottery options alone (model M,
risk-insensitive), the mean and lottery variance (model MV), and
for experiment 2, the mean variance and skewness (model MVS).
Risk-sensitive models far outperformed the risk-insensitive
model demonstrating that subjects’ choices were significantly
influenced by decision risk (Figure 3A). Moreover, the MVS
model was superior to the MV model in predicting choice in
experiment 2 (Figure 3B), showing that individuals are influenced
by both risk dimensions of variance and skewness (experiment 1:
BICM=11827, BICMV=5964, MV model posterior probabili-
ty.0.99 (very strong evidence in favour of MV model);
experiment 2: BICM=12999, BICMV=8708, BICMVS=8352,
MVS model posterior probability.0.99 (very strong evidence in
favour of MVS model)).
We estimated parameters corresponding to tastes for our 2
independent risk domains, variance (r) and skewness (l), as well as
choice randomness (b), for each subject and each condition (drug/
placebo) independently. We entered individually estimated
parameters into group-level analysis to test for differences.
Participants were on average averse to variance in both
experiment 1 (rPLACEBO=20.13, SD +/20.08; rLDOPA =20.15,
SD +/20.10) and experiment 2 (rPLACEBO=20.11, SD +/
20.07; rLDOPA=20.12, SD +/20.10). While 19/20 subjects
here were variance averse, skew preferences were heterogeneous
(lPLACEBO= 0.0039, SD +/20.0253; lLDOPA =0.0011, SD +/
20.0169), with 8/20 positive skew-seeking individuals (on
placebo). b values were low (experiment 1: bPLACEBO=0.52 SD
+/20.17, bLDOPA= 0.49 SD +/20.13; experiment 2: bPLACE-
BO= 0.53 SD +/20.18, bLDOPA =0.53 SD +/20.24), indicating
that choices were well partitioned by the behavioural models and
that choice noise was low.
2.2 Drug-induced changes in preference. There were no
significant differences in r, l, or b parameters between drug and
placebo sessions, either in experiment 1 (paired t-tests, r:
t19 = 1.63, p = 0.12; b: t19 = 0.35, p = 0.96; Figure 3C) or in
experiment 2 (paired t-tests, r: t19 = 0.29, p= 0.78; l: t19 = 0.62,
p = 0.54; b: t19 = 0.01, p = 0.99, Figure 3D). This indicates that
L-dopa had no effect on altering risk-return tradeoffs, either in
terms of the impact of the spread of outcomes, or on relative losses
and gains. Moreover, there was no effect on choice randomness –
choices were equally noisy in both sessions.
We also checked for evidence of skewness intransitivity in
experiment 2 by fitting a different model (MVS2) where subjects
can express different sensitivities for positive and negatively skewed
lotteries. If individuals prefer or dislike both positive and negative
skew, this will not be well captured by the MVS model, hence
lowers our power to detect drug-induced changes in preference.
Figure 2. Behavioural results. A. Experiment 1– Expected value – variance manipulation. B. Experiment 2– Variance – skewness manipulation. On
left, scatterplots of percentage gambling choices on levodopa and placebo (n = 20). Gambling choice percentage is very highly correlated for
individuals for the two separate (placebo and levodopa) attended sessions (linear fit through origin - Experiment 1: F1,19 = 431, p,0.01, r = 0.98;
Experiment 2: F1,19 = 123, p,0.01, r = 0.93).On right, percentage differences in gambling choice between placebo and levodopa conditions plotted
per subject with average effect size (ns = non-significant, error bars show standard error).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0068177.g002
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Indeed, theMVS2 model was significantly better than the simpler
MVS model at explaining choice, even accounting for its extra
parameter (BICMVS=8352, BICMVS2=7914), and revealed that
9/20 participants disliked both positive and negative skew
compared to symmetric gambles, while 3/20 preferred both
positive and negative skew. However, even in this more sensitive
model, we detected no difference in preference (or choice noise)
between drug and placebo (average parameter values: rPLA-
CEBO=20.12, SD +/20.08, rLDOPA=20.12, SD +/20.10;
l+PLACEBO= 0.0052, SD +/20.0207; l+LDOPA= 0.0073, SD +/
20.0246; l2PLACEBO=20.0027, SD +/20.0241;
l2LDOPA=20.0002, SD +/20.0339; bPLACEBO=0.55 SD +/
20.23, bLDOPA= 0.53 SD +/20.23. Paired t-tests, r: t19 = 0.21,
p = 0.84; l+: t19 = 0.50, p = 0.62; l
2: t19 = 0.35, p = 0.73; b:
t19 = 0.30, p = 0.77).
2.3 Changes in preference over time. Given the observed
(non-significant) changes in percentage gambling over time in both
experiments, we tested whether this translated into significant
changes in model parameter estimates for risk preference,
expected if the model-based approach is indeed more sensitive
in detecting such changes. As anticipated, there were significant
changes in variance preference parameters from week 1 to week 2
(paired t-tests: experiment 1 - r: t19 = 2.82, p= 0.01; experiment 2
- r: t19 = 2.09, p = 0.05; l: t19 = 1.59, p = 0.13, Figure S1).
Discussion
We explored the effect of L-dopa administration on evaluation
of different aspects of risk, and the impact on decision making, in
healthy humans. To control for possible drug-induced changes in
learning and response to reward, our paradigm was specifically
designed to isolate effects on risk evaluation. Moreover, by using
an economic task and behavioural modelling, we could empirically
quantify changes in risk preferences.
1. Risk Sensitivity
All subjects were sensitive to risk, being generally averse to
increasing variance (spread of outcomes), and with a range of
preferences for skewed gambles (asymmetrical distribution of
outcomes). Our behavioural modelling revealed the importance of
both risk dimensions, as simpler models based only on the average
anticipated reward (expected value) failed to explain behaviour as
well as the MV and MVS models. Crucially, we find that L-dopa
administration does not affect preferences for either variance or for
skewness. Moreover, the fact that we observe no changes in
Figure 3. Behavioural modelling. A. Experiment 1: Log-evidence, approximated by the Bayesian information criterion (BIC), for mean only (M)
and mean-variance (MV) models. Fixed effects analysis of Group Bayes Factors shows MV highly significantly superior to M model (likelihood ratio
test: p,1025). B. Experiment 2: BIC scores for mean-variance (MV) and mean-variance-skewness (MVS) models. MVS highly significantly superior to
MVmodel (likelihood ratio test: p,1025). BIC= k.ln(n) –2ln(L), where L is the model likelihood, n is the number of observations and k is the number of
free parameters. Lower BIC indicates better model fit. C. Experiment 1: Differences in (standardised) model parameters for choice noise (b) and
variance preference (r) between placebo and levodopa sessions. Error bars show standard deviation. D. Experiment 2: Differences in (standardised)
model parameters for choice noise (b), variance (r), and skewness (l) preference between placebo and levodopa sessions. Error bars show standard
deviation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0068177.g003
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experiment 1 means that neither average value, variance, or the
trade-off between them is influenced by L-dopa.
Our paradigm substantially differs from previous psychophar-
macological studies of risk, as we assess choice preferences for
independent statistical features of a distribution of outcomes. This
economic quantification of risk preference lends power and
precision over previous paradigms used to assess risk-taking (e.g.
Cups task [32], Game of Dice Task [33], Risk Task [34]). In these
tasks risk is explicitly described for participants, as opposed to less
specific alternatives such as the IGT and Ballon Analogue Risk
Task (BART) [35] where participants are uncertain about the real
probability of rewards. Summary measures of percentage gam-
bling are used to delineate risk-taking, however these measures are
specific to the set of stimuli used - stimulus sets in which different
features, such as expected value, variance, and skewness, are often
correlated. This renders it difficult to quantify precise effects, to
map these on to specific psychological or neural processes, and to
determine the true effect size of choice shifts.
Our observed lack of drug effect cannot be simply accounted for
by an inability of the task to engage participants, or due to the
large variety of risk levels presented impairing the ability to make
appropriate responses. The fact that subjects demonstrated clear
and consistent risk-sensitivity (to both variance and skewness)
indicates that subjects were attentive and able to execute the task
correctly (i.e. to make considered decisions between risky and risk-
free choices in accordance with intrinsic preferences). There was
also a strong consistency in individuals’ choices over time. This
correlation was slightly less in experiment 2, perhaps reflecting
that preferences for variance are more stable than those for
skewness. Here we employed a within-subject design with twenty
subjects tested on two separate occasions, which potentially could
induce a desire for consistency in choice behavior and explain a
lack of effect. However, this paradigm and closely related tasks
with similar sample sizes have been used to delineate changes in
risk-preference induced by physiological manipulations such as
hunger and satiety [36] and psychological manipulations such as
making decisions for losses versus gains [37].
Our paradigm was sensitive to small changes in risk preference,
as revealed by the systematic decrease in propensity to gamble
from week 1 to week 2 across subjects. Moreover, the model-based
analysis showed greater sensitivity in detecting this change than
the overall measure of percentage gambling choice. The 6%
choice shift in experiment 1 was explained by a significant increase
in variance aversion (r), which translates in financial terms to a
difference in risk premium of £0.80 for a 50:50 chance of winning
£10 or £0 (i.e. this same gamble becomes £0.80 less appealing to
an individual from week 1 to week 2). Thus although our
paradigm was sensitive to this small, systematic drift in risk attitude
over time, we did not detect a drug effect.
It can also be difficult to distinguish between drug induced
changes in risk-reward tradeoff versus changes in choice noise in
previous paradigms. Inattentive or random responding in a binary
choice task will shift choice proportions towards 50%, an effect
which can often masquerade as a change in risk evaluation, and
may account for some previous findings in drug studies [38].
Importantly, we can account for non-specific effects of drug
administration on the randomness of responses in our behavioural
model, which partitions effects into changes in risk preferences,
and the independent quantification of choice noise.
2. Effects of L-dopa
It is possible that our L-dopa administration did not cause
sufficient physiological effects to influence behaviour, and inter-
individual variability in drug pharmokinetics is a potential source
of heterogeneity in our results. However, the oral dose of 100 mg
L-dopa used here has been previously employed in a range of
studies, demonstrating effects on semantic priming [39,40,41],
cognitive control [42], learning and memory [43,44,45,46],
perception [47], and decision-making [48,49]. A 100 mg oral
dose minimises side effects of nausea or drowsiness, which can
significantly impact upon performance. Although oral administra-
tion is used in standard clinical practice, this delivery method relies
on systemic absorption into the central nervous system which is
another source of variability. We also ensured a delay between
drug administration and task execution such that the task was
performed at the expected time of peak L-dopa concentration
[50], making it unlikely that the lack of effect is only due to low L-
dopa levels.
3. Risk Versus Reward Learning
Given previous reports of the effects of dopamine manipulation
on risk-taking in patients and healthy humans, we speculate about
alternative explanations for the lack of effect here. We were careful
to design our task to eliminate effects of learning and reward
feedback. Here, our stimuli were explicit, whereas in many
previous studies the level of risk associated with a stimulus needs to
be learnt over a number of trials. For example, in the IGT where
different decks of cards are presented, the quality of the decks
needs to be ascertained by repeated sampling [51]. Since
dopamine has a central role in reward-based learning, and
encodes reward-prediction error [22], it is possible that the effects
of dopaminergic manipulation are expressed at this early stage
when probabilistic contingencies are being acquired. L-dopa
augments dopamine release at synapses [26] and could encourage
risk-taking by boosting the apparent value of stimuli in the face of
unpredictable reward, which has been proposed as a neurocom-
putational mechanism underlying addiction [52]. Moreover,
differential effects of dopamine on the response to rewards and
punishments [53,54,55] which could encourage risk-taking if
positive prediction errors are given more weight than negative
prediction errors [56,57], leading to an overestimation of value for
risky stimuli. This effect cannot be engendered in our paradigm, as
all choices were resolved after the end of the experiment, as
standard in experimental economic paradigms [58].
Related to this is the distinction between explicit risk, where the
probabilities of outcomes are precisely known, and ambiguity,
where the outcome distribution is unknown and needs to be learnt
through exploration. Ambiguity-aversion is a well-known behav-
ioural bias [59], distinct from risk attitude [60], however the two
are conflated in risk-taking tasks such as the BART and IGT
where risks are not explicit. Our finding of a lack of effect of
dopamine on risk evaluation is consistent with findings in PD
patients of specific deficits in decision making under ambiguity
rather than risk [61].
4. Dopaminergic Effects, Genetic Variability, and the Role
of other Neurotransmitters
Other explanations for the absence of a change in risk-taking
with L-dopa include specific dopamine receptor subtype effects,
genetic heterogeneity in responses, or other neurotransmitter
systems being central to risk evaluation.
Impulse control disorders are noted side effects of dopamine
agonists in particular [10]. Risk-taking may therefore be a specific
by-product of D1-receptor stimulation, an effect opposed by
simultaneous D2-receptor stimulation. Contrary to this is the
finding that the risk-promoting effects of amphetamine are
abolished by both D1- and D2-receptor antagonists [14], and
that D1, D2 and D3-specific dopamine agonists are all reported to
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induce gambling behaviour [62,63], although D3- receptor agonist
effects are also reported to decrease risky choice in an animal
model [14]. L-dopa itself potentiates gambling behaviour in co-
administration with dopamine agonists [12]. An abnormal
baseline in PD patients with depleted nigrostriatal systems may
engender disrupted dopamine receptor expression or sensitivity
that render this vulnerability to agonist effects, however these side-
effects have also been reported in individuals treated for restless
legs syndrome [64]. L-dopa promotes the phasic and tonic release
of dopamine from synapses in response to afferent depolarisation,
while dopamine agonists enhance the tonic stimulation of post-
and pre-synaptic receptors in a non-physiological manner [65].
Thus, differential effects of these agents could be attributed to a
distinction between phasic and tonic dopamine, which have been
suggested to map onto different computational processes [66]. An
important future avenue for research is to delineate whether effects
on gambling behaviour are dopamine-receptor specific, and
whether any effects pertain to risk evaluation or other processes
such as learning and reward-responsiveness.
Genetic heterogenetiy may also determine the effects of L-dopa
on risk-taking, given that polymorphisms in the D1 [67,68], D2
[69,70] and D4 [71,72] receptor, and the dopamine transporter
gene [72], have been associated with risky or impulsive behaviour.
Although we were careful to consider within-subject effects to
minimise the role of between-subject variability, it is still possible
that significant variability could mask an effect at an individual
level. For example, pharmacogenetic interactions have been
demonstrated, with a report of L-dopa increasing risk-taking, in
a paradigm with feedback and dynamic risk changes, only for
subjects with a specific DRD4 polymorphism [73]. Dopamine
receptor polymorphisms are also suggested to mediate different
neuronal responses to reward during gambling tasks [74,75,76].
Given the constellation of findings, and the fact that individual
polymorphisms appear to account for only a small fraction of the
tendency to pathological gambling [72], the specific effects of each
on different elements of the decision making and learning process
remains a challenge for future large scale investigations.
It is also possible that an alternative neurotransmitter is involved
in imbuing risk-preference. Evidence from both neuroimaging and
single-unit recording studies have implicated serotonin in reward
processing [77,78,79], and serotonin augmentation [80] or
depletion [81,82] alters reward and risk-based decision-making.
An effect of serotonin on risk-attitude could also contribute to the
effect of satiety and starvation on decision making under risk [36].
While the rewarding and appetitive effects of food have been
attributed to dopaminergic systems [83], serotonin is also critical
in behavioural homeostasis [84]. Serotonin and dopamine
receptor genes may also interact to determine propensity for
risk-taking [85].
Conclusion
The central finding from this study is that 100 mg L-dopa
administration does not affect risk preference in healthy humans.
This is in contrast to studies implicating dopamine in risky decision
making, and potentially suggests that these effects of dopamine are
effected via other mechanisms such as modulation of learning or
response to reward, rather than the evaluation of risk itself. Given
that a lack of effect cannot be conclusively interpreted as evidence
of no effect, these conclusions are necessarily speculative. Clearly
future work is needed to test the hypotheses arising from the
present study, specifically that dopamine influences decision-
making by affecting the response to feedback rather than risk
evaluation. It also remains to be determined if this lack of effect is
specific to levodopa or a generic finding about dopaminergic
transmission. Our paradigm offers careful control over different
aspects of risk which are often conflated in behavioural studies,
and a quantification of risk-preference independent of non-specific
effects on choice noise due to attentional changes. Thus, this task
could be further adapted to dissociate possible effects of dopamine
on reward feedback, and to explore the effects of stimulation of
different dopamine receptor subtypes as well as other neuromod-
ulatory agents.
Economically inspired paradigms can offer experimental control
to selectively manipulate aspects of a decision and sensitively assay
pharmacological effects. Understanding the role of dopamine in
decision making under risk is critically important given its central
role as a signalling agent in the brain, the cognitive effects of
disease process affecting the dopaminergic system such as
Parkinson’s disease, and side effects from clinical treatments as
well as drugs of abuse.
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